James Brickley
Senior Assoc Dean of Faculty & Research
Gleason Professor of Business Administration
Area(s) of Expertise
Economics and Management
Bio
Brickley has served as a full-time faculty member at the Simon School since 1990. He is currently the Gleason Professor of Business Administration and Senior Associate Dean of Faculty and Research. His primary research interests are in the areas of corporate governance and the economics of organizations. Brickley is a past winner of the Simon School’s Distinguished Teaching Award. He has also been listed multiple times on the School’s Teaching Honor Roll. Brickley has consulted with various corporations and law firms.
- Courses
-
Corporate GovernanceManagerial EconomicsStrategy Org & Firm ValueCompetitive Strategy
- Research Interests
-
Professor Brickley has research and teaching interests in the economics of organizations, corporate governance, executive compensation, corporate finance, franchising, and banking. His papers have been published in the Journal of Business, the Journal of Law and Economics, the Journal of Finance, the Journal of Accounting and Economics, the Journal of Financial Economics, the Journal of Economic Perspectives, the Journal of Law Economics and Organizations, the Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, the Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Health Economics, the Journal of Risk and Insurance, the Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Financial Management, and the Journal of Corporate Finance. The seventh edition of Managerial Economics and Organizational Architecture (authored by Brickley, Clifford W. Smith Jr. and Jerold L. Zimmerman) was published by McGraw-Hill/Irwin in 2021. Brickley, Smith, Zimmerman and Janice Willett authored a trade version of this text entitled Designing Organizations to Create Value in 2003. Brickley and Smith published An Advanced Introduction to Corporate Finance in 2022 (Edward Elgar Publisher). Brickley has served as associate editor of finance and accounting journals. Various studies have reported that Brickley is among the more cited researchers in leading finance journals. In 2002, three of his published papers received the Journal of Financial Economics All Star Paper Award (based on number of citations).
- Publications
-
Advanced Introduction to Corporate Finance2022Edward Elgar Publishing“Are Firms with ‘Deep Pockets’ More Responsive to Tort Liability? Evidence from Nursing Homes”2022Health Economics/WileyIssue8Volume31Managerial Economics and Organizational Architecture2021McGraw-Hill IrwinIssue7thFive-Star Ratings and Managerial Turnover: Evidence from the Nursing Home Industry2021The Journal of Law, Economics, and OrganizationMalpractice Laws and Incentives to Shield Assets: Evidence from Nursing Homes2017Journal of Empirical Legal StudiesIssue2Volume14Managerial Economics and Organizational Architecture2016McGraw HillIssue6thManagerial Economics and Organizational Architecture 6th ed2014McGraw Hill IrwinIssue6Ownership, Branding and Multiple Audience Concerns: Evidence from Nursing Homes2013Academy of Management ProceedingsIssue1Volume2013The Economic Determinants of Vertical Organizations: Evidence from Bankers' Banks2012Journal of Financial EconomicsVertical integration to avoid contracting with potential competitors: evidence from bankers’ banks2012Journal of Financial EconomicsIssue1Volume105Ownership, Branding and Multiple Audience Concerns: Evidence from Nursing Homes2011Simon School Working Paper No. FR 11-26Corporate Governance Myths2010Journal of Accounting and EconomicsBoard composition and nonprofit conduct: Evidence from hospitals2010Journal of Economic Behavior & OrganizationIssue2Volume76Corporate governance myths: comments on Armstrong, Guay, and Weber2010Journal of Accounting and EconomicsIssue2Volume50Using Organizational Architecture to Lead Change*2009Journal of Applied Corporate FinanceIssue2Volume21The Role of CEOs in Large Corporations: Evidence from Ken Lay at Enron2007Simon School Working Paper No. FR 07-14Contract Duration: Evidence from Franchising2006Journal of Law and EconomicsVolumeXLIXEconomía empresarial y arquitectura de la organización2005McGraw-HillBoard Composition and Private Inurement in Nonprofit Organisations: Evidence from Hospitals2004Manuscript (University of Rochester)Diseno de organizaciones para crear valor: de la estrategia a la estructura2004McGraw-HillManagerial Economics and Organizational Architecture2004New York: McGraw-Hill/IrwinBoard structure and executive compensation in nonprofit organizations: Evidence from hospitals2003William E. Simon Graduate School of Business Administration, University of RochesterBoundaries of the firm: evidence from the banking industry2003Journal of Financial EconomicsIssue3Volume70Contract duration: Evidence from franchise contracts2003Simon School of Business Working Paper No. FRCorporate governance, ethics, and organizational architecture2003Journal of Applied Corporate FinanceIssue3Volume15Empirical research on CEO turnover and firm-performance: A discussion2003Journal of Accounting and EconomicsIssue1Volume36执行力组织: Designing organizations to create value2003汕头大学出版社Business ethics and organizational architecture2002Journal of Banking & FinanceIssue9Volume26Designing organizations to create value: From strategy to structure2002McGraw Hill ProfessionalDesigning organizations to create value: From strategy to structure2002New York: McGraw-HillManagerial Incentives in Nonprofit Organizations: Evidence from Hospitals*2002Journal of law and EconomicsIssue1Volume45Royalty rates and upfront fees in share contracts: evidence from franchising2002Journal of Law, Economics, and OrganizationIssue2Volume18Changing incentives in a multitask environment: evidence from a top-tier business school2001Journal of Corporate financeIssue4Volume7Does the Decision to Retain Retiring Executives on the Board of Directors Help to Control Agency Problems in American and Japanese Firms?2001Palgrave Macmillan UKLa teoría del juego en la estrategia empresarial2001Harvard Deusto Business ReviewIssue103Managerial economics and organizational architecture2001McGraw-Hill/IrwinVolume7An introduction to game theory and business strategy2000Journal of Applied Corporate FinanceIssue2Volume13BOARD SEATS FOR RETIRED CEOS? IT DEPENDS ON HOW THEY PERFORM BEFORE THEY RETIRE.2000DirectorshipIssue5Volume26Incentives in nonprofit organizations: Evidence from hospitals2000Simon School of Business Working Paper No. FR 00-02Fundamentos economicos da arquitetura organizacional1999Sumários Revista da ESPMIssue1Volume6Incentive conflicts and contractual restraints: evidence from franchising*1999The Journal of Law and EconomicsIssue2Volume42Introduction: Special issue on franchising1999Journal of Business VenturingIssue4Volume14Teaching the Economics of Organizations1999Financial Practice and EducationVolume9What happens to CEOs after they retire? New evidence on career concerns, horizon problems, and CEO incentives1999Journal of Financial EconomicsIssue3Volume52’The Impact of Long-Range Managerial Compensation Plans on Shareholder Wealth’, Journal of Accounting and Economics, 7 (1-3), April, 115-291999INTERNATIONAL LIBRARY OF CRITICAL WRITINGS IN ECONOMICSVolume103Leadership structure: Separating the CEO and chairman of the board1997Journal of Corporate FinanceIssue3Volume3Management fads and organizational architecture1997Journal of Applied Corporate FinanceIssue2Volume10Managerial Economics and Organizational Architecture1997Richard d IrwinOrganizational architecture: A managerial economics approach1996IrwinCorporate leadership structure: On the separation of the positions of CEO and Chairman of the Board1995The economics of organizational architecture1995Journal of Applied Corporate FinanceIssue2Volume8Transfer pricing and the control of internal corporate transactions1995Journal of Applied Corporate FinanceIssue2Volume8Accounting information and internal performance evaluation: evidence from Texas banks1994Journal of Accounting and EconomicsIssue3Volume17Corporate Leadership Structure: On the Separation of the Positions of CEO and Chairman of the Board1994Corporate voting: Evidence from charter amendment proposals1994Journal of Corporate FinanceIssue1Volume1Ethics, incentives, and organizational design1994Journal of Applied Corporate FinanceIssue2Volume7LEADERSHIP STRUCTURE-ON THE SEPARATION OF THE POSITIONS OF CEO AND CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD1994Issue3Volume49Outside directors and the adoption of poison pills1994Journal of financial EconomicsIssue3Volume35The costs of inefficient bargaining and financial distress: Evidence from corporate lawsuits1994Journal of Financial EconomicsIssue2Volume35Stock-based incentive compensation and investment behavior1993Journal of Accounting and EconomicsIssue1-3Volume16THE BOARD-OF-DIRECTORS AND THE ENACTMENT OF POISON PILLS1993Issue3Volume48An agency perspective on franchising1991Financial ManagementDefending Against Hostile Takeovers: Impact on Shareholder Wealth1991Managerial FinanceIssue1Volume17Direct employee stock ownership: An empirical investigation1991Financial ManagementDividend policy1991Palgrave Macmillan UKIncentives of Divisional Managers: Evidence from Texax Banks1991The economic effects of franchise termination laws1991The Journal of Law & EconomicsIssue1Volume34The tax-timing option and the discounts on closed-end investment companies1991Journal of BusinessInternal corporate restructuring: An empirical analysis1990Journal of Accounting and EconomicsIssue1Volume12Dividend Policy1989Palgrave Macmillan UKRational Voting: Evidence from Corporate Charter Amendments1989Tulane UniversityManagerial Goals and the Court System: Some Economic Insights1988Can.-USLJVolume13Ownership structure and voting on antitakeover amendments1988Journal of financial economicsVolume20The market for corporate control: The empirical evidence since 19801988The Journal of Economic PerspectivesIssue1Volume2The Wealth Effects of Interfirm Lawsuits: An Empirical Investigation1988Center for Research in Security Prices, Graduate School of Business, University of ChicagoWhy firms restructure: An empirical analysis1988Managerial Indemnification and Liability1987Journal of Risk and InsuranceIssue4Volume54Investment opportunities, the reluctance to cut dividends, and corporate payout policy: The case of annual extra dividends1987Managerial Economics Research Center, William E. Simon Graduate School of Business Administration, University of RochesterManagerial indemnification and liability insurance: The effect on shareholder wealth1987Journal of risk and insuranceOwnership structure and the monitoring of managers1987University of Rochester, Managerial Economics Research Center, William E. Simon Graduate School of Business AdministrationResidual Claims, Decision Rights, and Board Structure1987University of Rochester, Managerial Economics Research Center, William E. Simon Graduate School of Business AdministrationShareholder wealth, information signaling and the dividend extra1987University MicrofilmsThe choice of organizational form the case of franchising1987Journal of financial EconomicsIssue2Volume18The pricing effects of interfirm cash tender offers1987The Journal of FinanceIssue4Volume42The takeover market, corporate board composition, and ownership structure: The case of banking1987The Journal of Law & EconomicsIssue1Volume30Access to deposit insurance, insolvency rules and the stock returns of financial institutions1986Journal of Financial EconomicsIssue3Volume16Discussion1986The Journal of FinanceIssue3Volume41Interpreting common stock returns around proxy statement disclosures and annual shareholder meetings1986Journal of Financial and Quantitative AnalysisIssue03Volume21Is board composition a substitute for an active takeover market in banking?1986The authorization of additional common stock: an empirical investigation1986Financial ManagementIncentive effects of stock purchase plans1985Journal of Financial EconomicsIssue2Volume14Lifting the lid on closed-end investment companies: A case of abnormal returns1985Journal of Financial and Quantitative AnalysisIssue01Volume20The impact of long-range managerial compensation plans on shareholder wealth1985Journal of accounting and economicsIssue1Volume7Cumulative voting: The value of minority shareholder voting rights1984JL & Econ.Volume27Shareholder wealth, information signaling and the specially designated dividend: An empirical study1983Journal of Financial EconomicsIssue2Volume12Discussion: empirical evidence on dividends as a signal of firm value1982Journal of Financial and Quantitative AnalysisIssue04Volume17